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CASE NOTES

warrant is constitutionally required, the constitutional restrictions must
apply.
The main point considered by the Court in deciding this case, however,
was the relationship between what the individual was forced to give up as
compared with benefits that the public welfare would derive by prompt
inspections. This conclusion was reached by examining the inspection
law which required three elements for a proper inspection: (1) there must
be valid ground for suspicion of a nuisance; (2) the inspection must be
made in the day time; and (3) the inspector can use no force in order to
enter. The Court indicates that as long as these elements are present in an
inspection law, the law will be upheld as constitutional as the invasion of
the person's privacy is slight, when compared with the benefit to public
good. As a result of this public good which the Court felt is to be desired,
the privacy of the individual in his home must be sacrificed.
The ramifications of the decision in the Frank case are not entirely
clear and can only be clarified by subsequent cases. The Court seemed
to emphasize the fact that the ordinance required the inspection to be
made during the day, that there was ground for suspicion of a nuisance on defendant's property and that no force was authorized. Thus
the Court may in subsequent cases limit the inspections without a search
warrant to cases where these three elements are present and require a
search warrant in all other inspections whether for civil or criminal information. On the other hand, the Court may extend the present decision to
all civil inspections whether the three elements are present or not. In either
case, the present decision has greatly limited a right which had long been
considered as being without limitation. Thus, a person who feels that he
has a right to privacy in civil cases, as well as in criminal cases, can no
longer look to the Constitution for protection of this right. His only recourse is to campaign against these ordinances and statutes which take this
right away from him by authorizing inspections without a search warrant.
CRIMINAL LAW-PROBATION BY FEDERAL COURT
DOES NOT PRECLUDE CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
OVER PROBATIONER BY STATE COURTS
Errol Leslie Merriman was indicted in the United States District Court
for Utah. A plea of guilty was interposed, imposition of sentence was deferred and Merriman was placed on probation for a period of five years.
According to the terms of his probation, Merriman was to return to his
home in Bakersfield, California, where he was to remain and live with his
wife, and supervision of probation was to be transferred to the United
States Probation Officer for the Southern District of California. Obedient
to the direction of the court, Merriman started by bus for his home.
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When the bus reached Fillmore, Utah, plaintiff sheriff took Merriman into
custody on a warrant of arrest issued upon a pending criminal charge of
violating a penal statute of the state. The United States District Court
issued a writ requiring the sheriff to deliver Merriman to the custody of
the federal marshal. The sheriff then filed a notice of appeal. In vacating
the order, the court of appeals held that where a federal court enlarged
accused on probation, it did not thereafter during the period of probation
have sole jurisdiction over him in the sense that state authorities were
precluded from taking him into custody upon a charge of violating a
criminal law of the state. This was found to be true even though the
court which placed him on probation objected to the prosecution by the
state. Stewart v. United States, 267 F.2d 378 (C.A. 10th, 1959).
This ruling is in direct opposition with Grant v. Guernsey,' an earlier
case decided by the same court. In the Guernsey case, the court held that
the defendant while on probation was subject to the jurisdiction of the
federal court. It further decided that the defendant during his probation
was immune to prosecution by a state court unless the federal court chose
to relinquish its jurisdiction.
The Guernsey case was decided only eight years after the federal probation system was put into operation throughout the country. 2 It was the
first decision dealing with the question of a state court taking into custody
a probationer of a federal court and it clearly equated probation with
physical custody of the defendant. In several subsequent cases, the courts
have reached a similar decision. In Dillingham v. United States,3 the court
held that one on probation was not at large except within the circumscribed limits permitted by his probation. The court said, "he is in law
and in fact in the custody and under the control of the court of his probation."4 Therefore, in this case we see the court following the Guernsey decision in equating probation and physical custody.
In Speece v. Toman, 5 a 1938 decision by the District Court for Illinois
did not follow so closely the reasoning in the Guernsey case. Here the
court held that one on probation from a federal district court could not be
taken out of that court's custody by a state court's subsequent sentence
without the express consent of the federal district court. This case dif163 F.2d 163 (C.A. 10th, 1933); cert. denied, 289 U.S. 744 (1933).
2 43 Stat. 1259 (1925), 18 U.S.C.A. § 3651 (Supp., 1958).

376 F.2d 35 (C.C.A. 5th, 1935).
4Ibid., at 36.

523 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ill., 1938). In this case the district court amended the probation order to expire immediately and directed delivery of the defendant to the sheriff
on sentence of the Illinois court, deciding that the probation order should not be used
as a means of conferring immunity from Illinois laws.
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fered from the Guernsey decision in that the court held the conviction by
the state court was valid but without the consent of the federal court it
could not execute the sentence.
In 1939, in United States v. Prendergast,6it was adjudged that while the
defendants were on probation they still were in federal custody, and while
in custody they could not otherwise be prosecuted without consent of the
federal court.
In 1948, United States v. McGowan 7 also followed the Guernsey decision. It held that one on probation was in the legal custody of the court
which imposed the sentence. Furthermore, it was stated that the court
which exercised its jurisdiction over defendant holds it to the exclusion of
all others until its duty is fully performed or until it relinquishes its jurisdiction.
Guernsey was therefore clearly not without following, particularly in
the earlier cases. There has been, however, a trend within the last twelve
years in the direction of the Speece case. For example, in United States v.
Fenno," the court decided that where a member of the naval reserve was
on probation by a federal district court at the time of his recall to active
duty for the purpose of trial by general court martial, the court martial
had jurisdiction in the absence of objection by the district court. This was
found to be the case even though consent of the district court to court
martial was not sought or obtained prior to trial. The Fenno case was one
of many which opposed Guernsey by holding that the second court had
jurisdiction without the consent of the first court.9
In the Stewart case, the court refers to its decision as being the first
time that it has followed the more recent trend. This seems doubtful
in view of Rawls v. United States.10 In the latter case, a federal district
court prosecuted one who was on parole from a state court. In that decision, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit held that the federal
district court had jurisdiction over the defendant even though the state
court had not given its consent to the prosecution. In reaching its deci6 28 F. Supp. 601 (W.D. Mo., 1939). The court implied that it would always consent

to the state court's jurisdiction.
7

80 F. Supp. 792 (Minn., 1948).

8 167 F. 2d 593 (C.C.A. 2d, 1948).
9 Strand v. Schmittroth, 251 F.2d 590 (C.A. 9th, 1957); United States v. Murphy, 217
F.2d 247 (C.A. 7th, 1954); Stripling v. United States, 172 F.2d 636 (C.A. 10th, '1949);
United States v. Fenno, 167 F.2d 593 (C.C.A.2d, 1948); Rawls v. United States, 166 F.2d

532 (C.C.A. 10th, 1948); Powell v. Sanford, 156 F.2d 355 (C.CA. 5th, 1946); Speece v.
Toman, 23 F. Supp. 119 (N.D. Ill., 1938).
10 166 F.2d 532 (C.C.A. 10th, 1948).

DE PAUL LAW REVIEW

sion, the court referred to the rule of comity" and held that it does not
destroy the jurisdiction of the second court. It only requires the later
court, in the interest of orderly administration of justice, to postpone the
exercise of its jurisdiction by not taking the defendant into custody until
the first sovereign is through with him. The court also stated in Rawls that
where there is no express objection by the first court, there is a presumption that the first court consented to the taking of the defendant. Other
2
courts have indulged in the presumption introduced in Rawls.'
It would seem that the court in Rawls abandoned the Guernsey decision
in that it held the second court to have jurisdiction without the consent
of the first. In the Rawls case consent, express or implied, was needed
only to comply with the rule of comity.
The rule set forth in the Speece case, that because of comity the second
court, before it can exercise its jurisdiction over the probationer, must
have the first court's consent, has been followed in United States v. Fenno. 13 Here the court held that under the rule of comity, the second court
has jurisdiction and may proceed unless there is objection on behalf of the
first court. Where such objection is present, the second court as a matter
of comity must decline to exercise its jurisdiction. The Rawls case added
the presumption that if the first court does not object, it will be held to
have consented.
The principal case seems to be more of a reversal of the Rawls case and
an abandonment of the rule of comity rather than a reversal of the
Guernsey case. This is demonstrated by the fact that in the Stewart case
the court held that the state court not only had jurisdiction but could proceed with its action regardless of the consent of the federal court to the
action. The court stated that not only could the state court proceed without the federal court's consent, but it could do so even where the federal
court affirmatively protested the state action. This decision finds support
in Strand v. Scbmittrothb4 where it was held that in cases where the first
court objects to the later court's action, the first court is without remedy.
This is predicated on the theory that where the court of one sovereign has
possession of the accused and has power to proceed in a criminal prosecution, neither the court nor the officers of another sovereign may remove
the accused since neither courtesy nor comity can be enforced.
11 "Under this rule the sovereigns have in effect agreed that the one first acquiring
custody of the defendant must be permitted to exhaust its remedy against him before the

other will exercise its jurisdiction over the same defendant." Rawls v. United States,
166 F.2d 532, 533 (C.C.A. 10th, 1948).
12 Spellman v. Murphy, 217 F.2d 247 (C.A. 7th, 1954); Stripling v. United States, 172
F.2d 636 (C.A. 10th, 1949); United States v. Fenno, 167 F.2d 593 (C.C.A.2d, 1948).
13

167 F.2d 593 (C.C.A.2d, 1948).

14 251 F.2d 590 (C.A. 9th, 1957).
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Therefore, the Stewart case follows the modern trend in recognizing
that probation and physical custody are not to be equated. It also recognizes that a court may have jurisdiction over a probationer without the
consent of the court which placed him on probation. On the other hand,
in its disregard for the rule of comity, it seems to have limited support.
DOMESTICS-PRESUMPTION OF LEGITIMACY NOT
OVERCOME BY NON-ACCESS UNTIL 232 DAYS
PRIOR TO BIRTH IN WEDLOCK
Richard Holder, plaintiff, commenced this suit for annulment of his
marriage to the defendant Ruth Holder on the grounds that his wife had
fraudulently induced him to enter into it by representing that she was
pregnant with his child. The parties had intercourse on December 24,
1956, were married on February 2, 1957 and the child was born on
August 13, 1957. The plaintiff contended this was not his child since the
normal period of gestation is 270 days, and that he had no access to his
wife until December 24, 1956, which was only 232 days prior to the birth
of the child. Before that time he was in Alaska. The Supreme Court of
Utah in reversing a decree for the plaintiff held that evidence which
showed only 232 days had elapsed between the first possible date of
coition and the date of birth was insufficient to overcome the presumption
of the legitimacy of a child. Holder v. Holder, 340 P.2d 761 (Utah, 1959).
The legal presumption is always that a child born in lawful wedlock is
legitimate.' This presumption is founded on morality, decency, and public
policy and is one of the strongest presumptions in the law.2 Although
there have been many and varied criteria or formulae used to determine
the sufficiency of rebutting evidence, 3 the majority of American courts
have, in cases involving the presumption of legitimacy, demanded more than
a mere preponderance of the evidence; most of them requiring clear, convincing, and satisfactory proof and some even requiring proof beyond a
reasonable doubt. 4 This proof must be sufficient to show that the husband
was: (1) impotent; (2) entirely absent, so as to have no intercourse or
communication of any kind with the mother; (3) entirely absent for the
period during which the child must, in the course of nature, have been begotten by the alleged father; or (4) only present under such circumstances
' Phillips v. Allen, 84 Allen (Mass.) 453 (1861).
2 Estate of Mills, 137 Cal. 298,70 Pac. 91 (1902).

3 9 Wigmore on Evidence, S 2527 (3rd ed., 1940).
4 Admire v. Admire, 42 N.Y.S.2d 755, 180 Misc. 68 (1943); In re Jones' Estate, 110
Vt. 438, 8 A.2d 631 (1939).

